In United States v. Hunt,[1]the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that in considering whether the abandonment principle applies to a person’s cell phone, courts should analyze the intent to abandon the digital device separately from the intent to abandon the device’s data—and not conflate the two. Finding that the defendant here did not abandon either, the Court nonetheless affirmed the denial of his suppressive motion because law enforcement obtained a warrant to search the phone and had a legitimate reason to retain the phone after its initial collection.
Background
In December 2017, Dontae Hunt was talking on his black iPhone walking by his apartment parking lot when he was shot five times and dropped his iPhone. The record showed that Hunt fled to seek medical help after he was shot. His girlfriend and her friend took Hunt to a hospital, but the dropped black iPhone was not taken. Eugene (Oregon) police visited the crime scene, where they found the black iPhone near some shrubs a short distance from the shooting location. The police took it into evidence as part of their investigation into the shooting. No one ever came looking for the phone, so it remained in evidence for over two years.
The federal government later started a separate drug investigation which eventually focused on Hunt. Federal agents obtained a premises search warrant for three residences associated with Hunt. During the raid on one of the residences, police found counterfeit fentanyl pills, firearms, and Hunt himself allegedly flushing pills down the toilet. Federal agents filed an affidavit in January 2020 to search several electronic devices, including the black iPhone found at the scene where Hunt had been shot and still held by the local police. At the time, federal agents still lacked confirmation that the black iPhone belonged to Hunt, though they suspected so because police found it on the ground where Hunt was shot. The search of the black iPhone produced more evidence of Hunt’s drug dealing activities.
Based on evidence from the searches of the residence where he was found and the black iPhone, Hunt was charged with several drug-related and other crimes. The District Court denied Hunt’s motion to suppress, holding that Hunt abandoned the black iPhone and thus lacked standing to challenge the search of the iPhone’s data. Hunt was convicted of the crimes. He appealed.
Discussion
The Fourth Amendment guarantees to the people the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the abandonment doctrine – a well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against a warrantless search and seizure – states that a person who abandons property forfeits a reasonable expectation of privacy by voluntarily abandoning that property. United States v. Fisher, 56 F.4th 673, 686 (9th Cir. 2022). Abandonment goes to intent. United States v. Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986). A person shows an intent to abandon a privacy interest when, given the totality of the circumstances, by “words, acts or other objective indications, [the] person has relinquished a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property at the time of the search or seizure.” Id. (citation modified).
The Court observed that as digital “technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon” traditionally private areas of life, the judiciary has sought to preserve “that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 305 (2018) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). The Court noted that a cellphone’s ability to store vast data likely allows the government to learn more about the cellphone’s owner than would a search of the person’s entire home or every piece of mail received. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396-97 (2014).
However, the Court of Appeals rejected Hunt’s invitation to jettison the abandonment doctrine for digital data. Instead, the Court followed the reasonable expectation of privacy framework set by the Supreme Court and adapted the abandonment doctrine to account for the unique characteristics of cellphone data. The Ninth Circuit held that based on the specific facts of each case, courts should analyze the intent to abandon the digital device separately from the intent to abandon the device’s data—and not reflexively conflate the two.
The Ninth Circuit found here that Hunt’s actions did not suggest an intent to abandon his black iPhone or its data, and that the District Court erred in finding otherwise. The Court of Appeals explained that the serious injuries caused by the shooting—and the traumatic and chaotic atmosphere after—suggested that Hunt likely dropped the black iPhone and did not intend to leave it behind. Considering the circumstances, Hunt likely only intended to get medical attention and flee from the shooter as soon as possible without thinking or even knowing what happened to the phone. The Court thus held that the District Court clearly erred in finding that Hunt intended to abandon the black iPhone, and it logically followed that he did not intend to abandon the data in it either. Though Hunt did not follow up with the police, the record did not establish that he had reason to suspect the police collected the black iPhone from the crime scene. The Court stated that a separate analysis of the stored data was unnecessary because it held that Hunt did not abandon his phone.
However, the Ninth Circuit concluded on the merits that Hunt’s Fourth Amendment claim failed because the federal agents obtained a warrant and searched his phone within a reasonable period.
The Court explained that the Eugene police had a legitimate law enforcement reason to seize the black iPhone as evidence for its investigation into the shooting. Moreover, police had a legitimate law enforcement reason to retain the iPhone after its initial collection simply because it represented lost property with no identified owner to whom the police could return it. Here, the record did not suggest that the Eugene police did anything with the black iPhone other than hold it in evidence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals accordingly affirmed.
HOW THIS AFFECTS YOUR AGENCY
Agencies may observe that the Court considered separate aspects of the abandonment doctrine with respect to the physical device, a cell phone, and the data that may have been contained thereon. This same logic would likely apply to computers, for example. Agencies may note that the search of the cell phone was conducted as part of the investigation into the defendant’s shooting, and was only conducted after federal agents applied for a search warrant despite the device being held by local police after it was found during their shooting investigation. The Court concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because federal agents obtained a warrant to search the phone’s data prior to the search and because police had a legitimate law enforcement reason to retain the cell phone. Moral of the story, if in doubt, obtain a search warrant, especially with respect to cell phones and other electronic devices.
As always, if you wish to discuss this matter in greater detail, please feel free to contact Jim Touchstone at (714) 446–1400 or via email at jrt@jones-mayer.com
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[1] 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22069 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025).