In Ciria v. Gerrans,[1] the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to officers who threatened an 18-year-old into adopting a story naming a plaintiff as the shooter in a murder where there was minimal objective evidence that the plaintiff was the shooter.
Background
In March 1990, Felix Bastarrica was shot and killed. San Francisco Police Department Inspectors James Crowley and Arthur Gerrans interrogated George Varela, who was at the murder scene, a few weeks later. Inspectors Crowley and Gerrans threatened Varela, then 18 years old and had a juvenile record, into adopting a story naming Joaquin Ciria as the shooter.
The inspectors threatened Varela with an adult murder charge for driving a vehicle they knew was involved in the murder. They told Varela what information was necessary to protect him from that adult murder charge, and to instead serve as a witness. The inspectors stated, “you don’t know that Joaquin was planning on killing somebody,” “[y]ou could be tried for murder,” “[y]ou got yourself into a situation, you know, and we know you didn’t do it. But if you’re going to continue to sit in here and lie and cover up for Joaquin, you’re going to be in some deep shit, because we know. . . The shit went down, it went sour, he shot, he jumped back in your car, and you drove off, and that’s exactly what happened. And be honest with us son. You’re only 18 years old, you’ve been [sic] shit as a juvenile, you don’t want to get in shit as an adult. . . .” Varela’s response to this was, “Hey, whatever you said” and “I don’t know how I’m supposed to even try to cover up. Like you said, I’m going to be 18.” Varela asked, “Can I go home after this?” The inspectors responded, “After we talk? Yeah.” Varela was not given Miranda warnings. Varela confirmed to the inspectors that he was talking to them because he wanted to be a witness rather than a suspect. Varela still did not explicitly name Ciria. Instead, he gave his account, starting with, “Okay, just like you said.”
Ciria voluntarily spoke with the Inspectors. He denied any involvement and offered an alibi. The inspectors never had any physical evidence linking Ciria to the crime, nor did they corroborate Varela’s account, nor investigate Ciria’s alibi before charging Ciria. The officers arrested Ciria and he was charged with murder. Varela was the star witness at Ciria’s criminal trial. In February 1991, Ciria was convicted of Bastarrica’s murder.
In April 2022, the San Francisco Superior Court granted in part Ciria’s state habeas petition challenging his conviction, and vacated his conviction on the ground that he presented credible new evidence of his innocence. The San Francisco District Attorney’s Innocence Commission found that his conviction could not stand and that he was factually innocent.
In November 2022, Ciria sued, among others, Inspector Crowley and Inspector Gerrans (“Defendants”) for, among other things, fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Defendants moved for summary judgment on Ciria’s federal claims, invoking qualified immunity. The District Court denied Inspectors Crowley and Gerrans qualified immunity on the fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution claims. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the denial of qualified immunity.
Discussion
The Ninth Circuit initially explained that a public officialsued for damages in his individual capacity is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) “the facts taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “the right in question was clearly established at the time of the officer’s actions, such that any reasonably well-trained officer would have known that his conduct was unlawful.” Orn v. City of Tacoma, 949 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 2020).
The Court explained that “[t]o prevail on a Section 1983 claim of deliberate fabrication, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant official deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty.” Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2017). Taking the facts as the District Court assumed them, and in the light most favorable to Ciria, the Ninth Circuit found that Ciria had presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendants used coercive or abusive tactics during Varela’s interrogation to fabricate evidence against Ciria. The Court explained that a reasonable jury could find that Defendants were deliberately indifferent or exhibited reckless disregard towards Ciria’s right not to be charged based on fabricated evidence; fabricated evidence against Ciria by using interrogation tactics including threatening Varela with an adult murder charge and offering him a story that exculpated him to get him to name Ciria as the shooter; and knew or should have known Varela was not telling the truth. The Court also found that Ciria had presented evidence that the inspectors “knew or should have known [their] interview tactics would yield false information.” Gausvik v. Perez, 345 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2003). This provided the requisite circumstantial evidence of “dishonesty.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
The Court also found that in 1990, it was clearly established that doing so would violate Ciria’s constitutional rights. The Court explained that Defendants did not dispute that in 1990, “there [was] a clearly established constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government.” Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1074-75, and that it was “virtually self-evident,” even without a prior case on point. Id. at 1075. Even if it were not obvious, an array of Supreme Court cases confirmed Ciria’s constitutional right not to be charged with deliberately fabricated evidence. See Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967), Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942), and Est. of Soakai v. Abdelaziz, 137 F.4th 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2025). Any reasonable officer would know that threatening a young witness and offering him a story that insulates him from liability to get him to falsely implicate a suspect violates the accused suspect’s due process rights. Thus, the Court concluded that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to the fabrication of evidence claim.
The Ninth Circuit also held that because a reasonable jury could find that Defendants lacked probable cause to charge Ciria without Varela’s statement and it was not “reasonably arguable” that probable cause existed, Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on Ciria’s malicious prosecution claim. Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
HOW THIS AFFECTS YOUR AGENCY
Agencies may observe that, aside from the interrogation deficiencies highlighted in this case, the inspectors here did not try to verify the witness’s story naming the plaintiff as the shooter, nor did they investigate the plaintiff’s alibi which listed multiple potentially corroborating witnesses. The inspectors never had any physical evidence linking Ciria to the crime, and there was no evidence that the plaintiff ever owned the type of weapon that the ballistics report identified as the murder weapon.
As always, if you wish to discuss this matter in greater detail, please feel free to contact James Touchstone at (714) 446–1400 or via email at jrt@jones-mayer.com
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[1] 178 F.4th 491 (9th Cir. 2026).