CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS DISCLOSURE OF OFFICERS’ NAMES
Acting in the case of Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach (2014 Cal. LEXIS 3757 (May 29, 2014)), the California Supreme Court, on a 6-1 vote, has held that the public interest in disclosure of the names of officers in an OIS will, as a general rule, outweigh in the privacy interest of the officers in having their names withheld.
History
On December 12, 2010, officers of the Long Beach Police Department were involved in the fatal shooting of an intoxicated man who pointed an apparent handgun at them. (Though said by officers to have been pointed as though — and appearing to them to be — a firearm, the device was later learned to have been a hose spray nozzle.)
The Los Angeles Times made a Public Records Act (CPRA) request for release by the City of the names of the involved officers, as well as those involved in shootings in the preceding several years.
The Long Beach POA sought to enjoin the City from releasing the names, an effort supported by the City. They maintained that the Police Department historically treated the names of officers under investigation as personnel records not subject to disclosure, and that disclosure of names of shooting-involved officers would endanger their safety.
The Los Angeles Times argued that under the CPRA the public interest in knowing the names of involved officers outweighed the privacy interest of the officers.
After the trial court denied injunctive relief, the POA and the City appealed without success before the Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court granted review.
Analysis
The Court began by observing that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state” (Gov. Code, § 6250) It is the responsibility of the public entity to demonstrate that any record it seeks to withhold falls within a specific exemption, though there is the “catchall exemption” of §6255(a) which allows withhold of a record if the public entity can demonstrate that on the facts of a particular case the public interest served by non-disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure.
The Court noted that Penal Code §832.8(f) applies confidentiality to any information in a peace officer personnel file where disclosure “would constitute an unwarranted invasion of [a peace officer’s] personal privacy.”
Acknowledging its prior holding in Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court,((2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272), where the Court held that a newspaper was not entitled to records of the administrative appeal from discipline by a deputy sheriff; the majority turned to its later case of Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training v. Superior Court, ((2007) 42 Cal.4th 278). InCommission, the Court concluded that peace officer personnel records include only the types of information enumerated in Penal Code section 832.8, and because the names of the officers, their employing agencies, and their employment dates maintained by POST did not fall into any of the enumerated categories, it was not information obtained from protected personnel records, and therefore it was subject to disclosure.
Although the Pitchess statutes limit public access to personnel records (Pen. Code § 832.7, subd. (a)), including officer names if they are linked to information in personnel records (Commission on Peace Officer Standards,supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 295), many records routinely maintained by law enforcement agencies are not personnel records. And although records related to the appraisal and discipline of officers would fall under the meaning of confidential personnel files, the Court did not interpret that term so broadly to include every record that might be considered for purposes of an officer’s appraisal or discipline, “for such a broad reading of the statute would sweep virtually all law enforcement records into the protected category of ‘personnel records.’”
In a case such as this one, which concerns officer-involved shootings, the Court found the public’s interest in the conduct of its peace officers is particularly great because such shootings often lead to severe injury or death. Examining the exemption under Gov. Code §6254(f), the Court observed that the Los Angeles Times was not seeking records of an investigation conducted by the Police Department, and so this exemption was inapplicable.
Turning last to the exemption under Gov. Code §6255(a) (weighing of public interest) the Court again noted that the balancing of interests will generally weigh in favor of disclosure, and that “[v]ague safety concerns that apply to all officers involved in shootings are insufficient to tip the balance against disclosure.” A mere possibility of endangerment does not clearly outweigh the public interest in access to records. (citing CBS, Inc. v. Block, 42 Cal.3d at 652)
But the Court did not hold that the names of officers in shootings have to be disclosed in every case; it simply rejected a blanket rule of non-disclosure and concluded that a particularized showing of factors in favor of non-disclosure would have to be made on a case specific basis.
Dissent
The Chief Justice dissented from the majority holding, finding persuasive the argument of the POA and City that the threat to officer safety from disclosure of the names of officers involved in shootings was sufficiently real as to warrant being withheld; that the names of officers involved in shootings fall within the meaning of personnel records under Gov. Code §6254(c); and that no compelling public interest is served by disclosing the names of involved officers as doing so does nothing to inform the public about the facts of the case or whether the officers misused their authority; and that both the laws governing the “Pitchess” process, as well as Gov. Code §6254(f) mitigate in favor of non-disclosure.
Holding
The names of officers involved in a shooting will generally be subject to disclosure upon request, unless a particularized and case specific showing can be made that non-disclosure is necessary to protect the officer’s safety and outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
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