Vol. 39 No. 11 THE PRESENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ONE CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING DOES NOT CATEGORICALLY DEFEAT A FOURTH AMENDMENT MALICIOUS-PROSECUTION CLAIM RELATING TO ANOTHER, BASELESS CHARGE

In Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon,[1] the Supreme Court of the United States vacated a Circuit Court’s holding that a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim may not succeed when a baseless charge brought by a government official is accompanied by a valid charge.  The high court held instead that any valid charges do not insulate the government official from a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to the invalid charge.

Background

Jewelry store owner Jascha Chiaverini bought a ring for $45 from a jewel thief.  The ring’s rightful owners found out about the sale, and asked Chiaverini to return their property.  Chiaverini refused, so the owners contacted the Napoleon (Ohio) Police Department.  Two police officers on a later visit to the store directed Chiaverini to surrender the ring to its owners, but he refused, saying that it contradicted a letter he had just received from the police department telling him to retain the ring as evidence.  When repeating his refusal to another officer the next day, Chiaverini indicated that he was operating his store without a license.

The officers subsequently charged Chiaverini in municipal court with three crimes:  receiving stolen property, a misdemeanor; dealing in precious metals without a license, also a misdemeanor; and money laundering, a felony.  For the money laundering charge to succeed, Chiaverini must have known when he bought the ring that the transaction involved the proceeds of unlawful activity.[2]  In support of that element in their warrant application, the officers averred that Chiaverini always suspected the ring was stolen.  After obtaining the warrant, the police arrested Chiaverini and detained him for three days.  However, county prosecutors later dropped the case.

Chiaverini, believing that his arrest and detention were unjustified, then sued the officers, alleging a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under 42 U. S. C. section 1983.  To prevail on this claim, he had to show in part that the officers brought criminal charges against him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure of his person.  See Thompson v. Clark, 596 U. S. 36, 43, and n. 2 (2022).  The District Court granted summary judgment to the officers, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of Appeals held that Chiaverini’s prosecution was supported by probable cause.  In holding this, the Sixth Circuit did not address whether the officers had probable cause to bring themoney-laundering charge.  In the appellate court’s view, there was clearly probable cause to charge Chiaverini with the two misdemeanors, and as long as one charge was supported by probable cause, a malicious-prosecution claim based on any other charge must fail.  Thus, in the Sixth Circuit’s view, a single, valid charge in a proceeding would insulate officers from a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to any other charges, no matter how baseless.

Because three other Courts of Appeals held that the presence of probable cause for one charge does not automatically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim alleging the absence of probable cause for another charge,[3] the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.

Discussion

The Supreme Court explained that the issue here was whether a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim could succeed when a baseless charge is accompanied by a valid charge.  The Court observed that the Sixth Circuit held that even if the felony count lacked probable cause, Chiaverini could not recover because the misdemeanor counts were adequately supported.  However, prior to the Supreme Court’s consideration of this case, the police officers and the United States as amicus curae in their respective briefings expressed disagreement with the Sixth Circuit’s view that a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim cannot succeed when a baseless charge is accompanied by a valid charge.

The Supreme Court explained that under the Fourth Amendment, a pretrial detention is an unreasonable seizure and is illegal, unless it is based on probable cause.  See Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. 357, 364-369 (2017).  Even when a detention is justified at the outset, moreover, it may become unreasonably prolonged if the reason for it lapses.  See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U. S. 348, 354-357 (2015).  Thus, if an invalid charge causes a detention to start or continue, then the Fourth Amendment is violated.  The Court decided that bringing the invalid charge alongside a valid one does not categorically preclude this possibility.  The Court described “the starkest possible example” of a person detained on a drug offense supported by probable cause and a gun offense that is not.  If the prosecutor drops the (valid) drug charge,leaving the person in jail on the (invalid) gun charge alone, then the baseless charge has caused a constitutional violation by unreasonably extending the detention.  The Court stated that the person should not be categorically barred from bringing a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim just because the baseless charge was brought along with a good one.

The Supreme Court held that the presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge.  This conclusion followed from both the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice.  The Supreme Court stated that these uncontested points sufficed to doom the Sixth Circuit’s categorical rule barring a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim if any charge is valid.  The United States Supreme Court accordingly vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded.

HOW THIS AFFECTS YOUR AGENCY

The Supreme Court noted that a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution suit depends not just on an unsupported charge, but on that charge’s causing a seizure—like the arrestand three-day detention in this case.  The parties and amicus curiae provided three different views of how that causation element is met when a valid charge is also in the picture, but the Court decided that issue was not properly before the Court, and left it for the Sixth Circuit to address on remand.

While determination of the proper test for examining potential malicious prosecution charges is still somewhat in flux, the Court’s decision provides a cautionary tale to officers.  Officers should only arrest and request prosecution of individuals on charges that are supported by articulable facts establishing probable cause to arrest for each specific crime underlying any given incident.

As always, if you wish to discuss this matter in greater detail, please feel free to contact me at (714) 446–1400 or via email at (jrt@jones-mayer.com).

Information on www.jones-mayer.com is for general use and is not legal advice.  The mailing of this Client Alert Memorandum is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client-relationship.


[1] 219 L. Ed. 2d 262 (2024).

[2] See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 1315.55(A)(1) (Lexis 2016).

[3] See Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F. 3d 1147, 1159-1162 (CA11 2020); Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F. 3d 75, 83-85 (CA3 2007); Posr v. Doherty, 944 F. 2d 91, 100 (CA2 1991)