In November 2022, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals posited the following certified question to the California Supreme Court: “Do non-convicted incarcerated individuals performing services in county jails for a for-profit company to supply meals within the county jails and related custody facilities have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code in the absence of any local ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages for these individuals?” In April 2024 in Ruelas v. Cnty. of Alameda,[1]the Supreme Court concluded that the answer was no.[2]
Based on the Supreme Court’s answer, the Ninth Circuit in July 2024 reversed[3] a lower court’s order denying the motion to dismiss of the defendants in the case.
Background
Under a contract with defendant Alameda County, defendant Aramark Correctional Services, LLC (“Aramark”), has undertaken the responsibility for operating the food service program and delivery of meals for inmates and staff at all Alameda County Sheriff’s Office facilities and satellite facilities. Satellite facilities include county jails located elsewhere in the state. Aramark, a private, for-profit company, provides the contracted-for food services using the industrial kitchen at the Santa Rita Jail. Jail inmates prepare and package the food in the industrial kitchen each day and clean and sanitize the kitchen after the conclusion of the day’s food preparation.
Plaintiffs Armida Ruelas et al. are or were pretrial or other non-convicted detainees confined at Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County who either prepared and packaged food or cleaned and sanitized the kitchen for Aramark. In November 2019, plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal district court against defendants the County of Alameda, Alameda County Sheriff Gregory J. Ahern (together, the County), and Aramark. Plaintiffs later filed a first amended complaint that asserted nine causes of action, including causes of action for minimum and overtime wages. The District Court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motions to dismiss the causes of action for minimum and overtime wages. In a simultaneously filed order, the District Court certified for interlocutory appeal the legal question of pretrial detainees’ entitlement to minimum and overtime wages.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the following question of state law to the California Supreme Court: “Do non-convicted incarcerated individuals performing services in county jails for a for-profit company to supply meals within the county jails and related custody facilities have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code in the absence of any local ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages for these individuals?”[4] In January 2023, the California Supreme Court agreed to answer the certified question.
Discussion
The California Supreme Court explained that Penal Code section 4019.3 creates a discretionary scheme for the payment of wage credits to county jail inmates, subject to a cap. Section 4019.3 provides: “The board of supervisors may provide that each prisoner confined in or committed to a county jail shall be credited with a sum not to exceedtwo dollars ($2) for each eight hours of work done by him in such county jail.” This Court observed that this wage credit, unchanged since 1975, is far below the state minimum wage for other workers.[5] Plaintiffs argued that Section 4019.3 is inapplicable where, as here, the individual is participating in a public-private work program. Defendants argued that Section 4019.3 applies broadly to all county inmates, including pretrial detainees, working in the county jail.
The Court agreed with the defendants, noting the terms of Section 4019.3 encompass all prisoners “confined in or committed to” a county jail. The Court also noted the broad construction accorded similar language—a prisoner “confined in or committed to a county jail”—in Section 4019 to describe who is eligible for custody and worktime credits. (Section 4019(a)(1)–(3), (b), (c); see also id., section 4000, subd. 2 [authorizing county jails to be used for detaining persons charged with a crime and “committed for trial”].) The Supreme Court explained that it had previously construed this language to include not only those who are serving a sentence in county jail, but also those who have simply been detained after an arrest and those who have been convicted but not yet sentenced.[6] The Court explained that because Sections 4019 and 4019.3 deal “‘with the same subject matter’”—i.e.,the class of county jail inmates who are eligible for an important benefit—the category of inmates confined in or committed to a county jail “should be accorded the same interpretation” in both instances.[7]
The Court pointed to an Attorney General opinion that reached the same conclusion almost 50 years earlier. (57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 276, 283 (1974).)[8] The Attorney General then noted that the Legislature enacted Section 4019.3 to equalize the wage credits for inmates working in jail with those already authorized by Section 4125 for individuals working at industrial farms or road camps. (See 57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 283; Assem. Com. on Crim. Procedure, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1394 (1959 Reg. Sess.) as introduced May 4, 1959, p. 1.) The “underlying purpose” of both provisions, the Attorney General observed, “is ‘to make possible the substitution of constructive labor for profitless prison confinement in order that those who are charged with or convicted of public offenses and deprived of their liberty may become better citizens because of their disciplinary experience.’” (57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 283, quoting § 4100.) “Penal Code section 4019.3 therefore applies to pre-sentence as well as post-sentence work time, the same beneficial purpose being served in both instances.” (57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 283.) Here, the Supreme Court found the Attorney General opinion about the scope of Section 4019.3 especially persuasive because the Legislature “left intact the language construed” by the Attorney General (Cal. Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank, 51 Cal.3d 1, 17) when it amended Section 4019.3 in 1975 to increase the cap on inmate wage credits from 50 cents to two dollars per eight-hour shift.[9]
The Supreme Court concluded that counties therefore may—but are not required to—credit inmates, including pretrial detainees, up to two dollars per eight-hour shift, notwithstanding the legal (much higher) minimum wage.
The Court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that Section 4019.3 is inapplicable where, as here, the individual is participating in a public-private work program. Plaintiffs argued that “work done … in such county jail” (Section 4019.3) must be construed to mean the inmate’s work must be done exclusively for the county jail. The Court concluded that “work done in such county jail” means work done at the jail, explaining that the word “in” ordinarily describes where an event takes place: “inside of, within the bounds or limits of.”[10]
Plaintiffs also argued that Section 4019.3 could not apply to public-private work programs because such partnerships were prohibited under the law at the time the statute was enacted. The Supreme Court determined that, even assuming that public-private partnerships for the labor of county jail detainees were not permitted at the time of Section 4019.3’s enactment, it did not follow that the statute could not apply to such partnerships. The Court stated that where, as here, “lawmakers choose broad statutory language ‘it is unimportant that the particular application may not have been contemplated.’” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Garcia (2013) 58 Cal.4th 175, 192, quoting Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90.)
Lastly, the Supreme Court found that nothing in Proposition 139, the Prison Inmate Labor Initiative of 1990, imposed an obligation on local governments or private entities to comply with the Labor Code’s minimum wage provisions for detainees working in county jails. Proposition 139 repealed the constitutional prohibition on contracting for “[t]he labor of convicts” and provided instead that “[t]he Director of Corrections or any county Sheriff or other local government official charged with jail operations[] may enter into contracts with public entities, nonprofit or for profit organizations, entities, or businesses for the purpose of conducting programs which use inmate labor.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1990), text of Prop. 139, sections 3, 4, p. 136, strikethrough omitted; see Cal. Const., art. XIV, section 5.) Whereas state prisoners were guaranteed by statute compensation “comparable to wages paid by the joint venture employer to non-inmate employees performing similar work for that employer,” for labor involving county jail inmates, Proposition 139 said only that, in addition “to statutes enacted by or in accordance with the Prison Inmate Labor Initiative of 1990,” the public-private programs “shall be operated and implemented pursuant to … local ordinances.” (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 139, section 4, p. 136-137.)
The certified question posed by the Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme Court to assume that no local ordinance governed plaintiffs’ work at the jail and the parties agreed that no such ordinance exists anyway. Plaintiffs argued that in the absence of a local ordinance, the Labor Code necessarily applies. However, the Supreme Court suggested that plaintiffs ignored that Section 4019.3 sets a specific wage range, well below the state minimum, for convicted and non-convicted inmates working in a county jail. In the absence of any local ordinance governing plaintiffs’ work at the jail, the Supreme Court found no clear conflict between article XIV, section 5 of the California Constitution and Penal Code section 4019.3. The Court noted that unless a conflict between a statute and a provision of the state Constitution is “clear and unquestionable,” it must uphold the statute. (California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 594.)
The California Supreme Court acknowledged policy concerns raised by the parties and their amici curiae, but stated that it was beyond its purview to determine whether the result here was a desirable policy. However, the Legislature could, if it deemed it appropriate to do so, adjust its approach to the payment of wages or wage credits for those awaiting adjudication of their cases as well as for convicted persons.
In sum, the California Supreme Court answered the Ninth Circuit’s certified question by concluding that non-convicted incarcerated individuals performing services in county jails for a for-profit company to supply meals within the county jails and related custody facilities do not have a claim for minimum wages and overtime underSection 1194 of the Labor Code, even in the absence of a local ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages for these individuals.
The Ninth Circuit held that the California Supreme Court’s response made clear that Plaintiffs’ minimum wage and overtime claims failed. The California Supreme Court concluded that Section 4019.3 applies broadly to all county inmates, including pretrial detainees, working in the county jail. Further, the California Supreme Court clarified that application of the statute does not turn on the identity of the employer and, therefore, applies to work performed for a private company like Aramark. The Ninth Circuit accordingly reversed the District Court’s order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss.
HOW THIS AFFECTS YOUR AGENCY
With the Supreme Court’s answer to the certified question here, Section 4019.3’s cap on the payment of wage credits to county jail inmates applies also to pretrial detainees and non-convicted incarcerated individuals in general who perform labor at county jails for public-private programs. Such persons are not entitled to state minimum wages or overtime rates for work performed in county jails. Rather, they are only entitled to those wages prescribed by the county for the county jail in which they perform the work, subject to the cap noted in Section 4019.3, and irrespective of whether the labor is performed for a private company operating in the county jail.
As always, if you wish to discuss this matter in greater detail, please feel free to contact me at (714) 446–1400 or via email at (jrt@jones-mayer.com).
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[1] 15 Cal. 5th 968 (2024).
[2] The Supreme Court stated early in its discussion that it did not separately address pretrial detainees’ entitlement to overtime wages because “[n]o one in this proceeding has articulated a separate argument for payment of overtime wages, distinct from payment of minimum wages. Moreover, the right to premium pay for overtime logically and legally depends on a right to some wage for regular work.”
[3] Ruelas v. Cnty. of Alameda, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 18488 (9th Cir. July 26, 2024).
[4] Ruelas v. County of Alameda, 51 F.4th 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 2022).
[5] See Labor Code section 1182.12.
[6] See People v. Dieck, 46 Cal.4th 934, 938–939 (2009).
[7] See Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc., 11 Cal.5th 158, 175 (2021).
[8] The Supreme Court observed that Attorney General opinions are entitled to “considerable weight” (Lexin v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1087, fn. 17 (2010)).
[9] Stats. 1975, ch. 350, section 1, p. 797.
[10] General American Indemnity Co. v. Pepper, 161 Tex. 263 (1960).