In Zorn v. Linton,[1] the United States Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion summarily reversed the Second Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity, holding that a law enforcement officer’s use of a routine wristlock on a non-compliant protester — following repeated verbal warnings — did not violate any clearly established constitutional right.
Background
On the Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin’s inauguration day in January 2015, protesters staged a sit-in at the state capitol to demand universal healthcare. Sheila Linton joined the protest. When the Capitol closed to the public for the night, 29 protesters including Linton remained in the legislative chamber, sitting on the floor with their arms linked. At that point, police officers explained that they would arrest the protesters for trespassing if they did not leave. They refused to leave. After removing more than a dozen protesters one by one, the officers turned to Linton.
Sergeant Jacob Zorn crouched down to speak with her, but she remained seated with her arms interlocked with those of her fellow protesters. As Linton passively resisted, Zorn unlinked her arm from another protester’s, put it behind her back in a rear wristlock, and twisted her arm. Linton exclaimed “‘ ow, ow, ow,’” while Zorn repeatedly asked her to “‘please stand up.’” After Linton responded, “‘I will not stand up,’” Zorn told her that he would ask “‘one more time’” and then would use more pain compliance. Linton refused. Zorn placed pressure on her wrist and lifted her up by her underarm. Linton yelled as she stood up. Once on her feet, Linton continued to jerk her arms and fell back to the floor. Zorn asked her to stand up again, and when she did not, three officers picked her up by her arms and legs and carried her outside. Linton alleged that she suffered physical and psychological injuries from the encounter, including post-traumatic stress disorder.
Linton sued Zorn under 42 U. S. C. section 1983, claiming that Zorn violated her Fourth Amendment right against excessive use of force. The District Court granted summary judgment for Zorn after concluding that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The District Court reasoned that it was not clearly established at the time of the encounter that, in these circumstances, lifting Linton while putting pressure on her wrist violated the Fourth Amendment.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Zorn was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals held that its decision in Amnesty America v. West Hartford, 361 F. 3d 113 (2nd Cir. 2004), clearly established that the “gratuitous” use of a rear wristlock on a protester passively resisting arrest constitutes excessive force. The Second Circuit remanded for a jury trial against Zorn. The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted Zorn’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Second Circuit’s application of the qualified immunity doctrine.
Discussion
The Supreme Court explained that government officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit under Section 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established law. Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U. S. 1, 5 (2021) (per curiam). “A right is clearly established when it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Ibid. A right is not clearly established if existing precedent does not place the constitutional question “‘beyond debate.’” Ibid.
The Supreme Court noted that to find that a right is clearly established, courts generally “need to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated” the Constitution. Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U. S. 38, 43 (2019) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant precedent must define the right with a “high degree of specificity,” so that “every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 63 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court observed that whether any particular use of force violates the Fourth Amendment depends on “the facts and circumstances of each particular case,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989), including whether the officer gave “warnings” before using force, Barnes v. Felix, 605 U. S. 73, 80 (2025). Yet in Amnesty America, nothing indicated that the officers gave the protesters any warning that they would use such force. While rear wristlocks on protestors were used, the court considered a wide range of additional allegations of excessive force. The Amnesty America Court did not hold that any of those actions violated the Fourth Amendment, but rather remanded for a jury trial because, while a “reasonable jury could . . . find that the officers gratuitously inflicted pain,” it was also “entirely possible that a reasonable jury would find . . . that the police officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances.” Id., at 124 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court noted that the Amnesty America decision relied on a decision approving the practice of warning protesters and then using wristlocks to move them. Ibid. (citing Forrester v. San Diego, 25 F. 3d 804, 807-808 (CA9 1994)).
The Supreme Court found that reasonable officials would not “interpret [Amnesty America] to establish” that using a routine wristlock to move a resistant protester after warning her, without more, violates the Constitution. Wesby, 583 U. S., at 63. Zorn repeatedly warned Linton that he would have to use more force if she did not stand up, and when she did not do so, he used a wristlock to bring Linton to her feet. Amnesty America never “held” that such conduct alone “violated” the Fourth Amendment. Emmons, 586 U. S., at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). Its statement that officers who had engaged in a wide range of aggressive conduct may have used excessive force did not “put [Zorn] on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.” Rivas-Villegas, 595 U. S., at 6.
Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that even assuming the Amnesty America decision established the general principle that the gratuitous use of pain compliance techniques — such as a rear-wristlock — on a protestor who is passively resisting arrest constitutes excessive force; that principle lacked the “high degree of specificity” needed to make it “clear” to officers which actions violated the law. Wesby, 583 U. S., at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted). That assumed principle still would not “obviously resolve” whether using a rear wristlock to move a noncompliant protester after repeated warnings violates the Fourth Amendment, id., at 64, as it failed to specify which circumstances make the use of force “gratuitous.” The Supreme Court concluded that the Amnesty America decision did not clearly establish that Zorn’s specific conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.
Because the Second Circuit failed to identify a case where an officer taking similar actions in similar circumstances “was held to have violated” the Constitution, Emmons, 586 U. S., at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Supreme Court concluded that Zorn was entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court accordingly granted his petition for writ of certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit.
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan and Justice Jackson, dissented. The dissent maintained that the Second Circuit correctly held that summary judgment must be denied because a jury could find that Zorn violated Linton’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Moreover, the Second Circuit’s decision was certainly not so clearly erroneous as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of a summary reversal. The dissent further argued that the majority’s insistence on a near-identical prior case to “clearly establish” the law creates a “one-sided approach” to qualified immunity that shielded law enforcement from liability.
HOW THIS AFFECTS YOUR AGENCY
Agencies may observe that the Supreme Court distinguished the facts set forth in the Amnesty America decision – where there was no evidence of the officers giving any warning prior to applying the rear wristlock on a nonviolent protestor – from the facts in this case where a warning was given repeatedly. This decision emphasizes the granularity of analysis of prior decisions to determine whether a law enforcement officer has violated a right that previously has been “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity jurisprudence.
As always, if you wish to discuss this matter in greater detail, please feel free to contact Jim Touchstone at (714) 446–1400 or via email at jrt@jones-mayer.com
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[1] Zorn v. Linton, No. 25-297 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2026) (per curiam).