Vol. 40 No. 13 GENERALIZED CONCERNS ABOUT VICTIM TRAUMA AND FAIR-TRIAL PUBLICITY WERE INSUFFICIENT TO FIND THAT “ACTIVE INVESTIGATION” EXEMPTION TO THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RECORDS ACT ABSOLVED POLICE OF THEIR DUTY TO RELEASE BODYCAM FOOTAGE
In Sacramento Television Stations Inc. v. Superior Court,[1] a Court of Appeal concluded that the record did not disclose substantial evidence for a superior court’s finding that the “active investigation” exemption to disclosure of recordings involving the discharge of a firearm by police applied, explaining that the few facts presented to the superior court lacked […]
Vol. 40 No. 12 BECAUSE AN OFFICER CONTINUED TO SHOOT A FALLEN AND INJURED SUSPECT ARMED ONLY WITH A BLADED INSTRUMENT WHO WAS ON HIS BACK WITH HIS KNEES CURLED UP TO HIS CHEST WHILE ROLLING AWAY FROM THE OFFICER, A JURY COULD REASONABLY FIND THAT THE OFFICER EMPLOYED CONSTITUTIONALLY EXCESSIVE FORCE
In Est. of Hernandez v. City of L.A.,[1] an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that although a police officer acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment when firing the first four rounds at an individual armed with a knife who approached the officer, there was a triable issue of fact […]
Vol. 40 No. 11 IN RESOLVING FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCESSIVE-FORCE CLAIMS, COURTS MAY NOT APPLY THE MOMENT-OF-THREAT RULE BECAUSE THAT RULE CONSTRICTS THE PROPER INQUIRY INTO THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
In Barnes v. Felix, the United States Supreme Court concluded that, in evaluating a police shooting, a rule used by the Fifth Circuit that looks only to the circumstances existing at the precise time an officer perceived the threat inducing him to shoot improperly narrows the requisite Fourth Amendment analysis. In rejecting this “moment-of-threat” rule, […]
Vol. 40 No. 10 OFFICERS WHO ENGAGED IN AN UNNECESSARY HIGH-SPEED CHASE THAT KILLED BYSTANDERS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In Est. of Soakai v. Abdelaziz,[1] the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied qualified immunity to police officers involved in a high-speed chase in which innocent bystanders were injured and one was killed by a fleeing suspect. Despite allegedly witnessing the crash, the officers neither stopped to render aid nor summoned emergency services. Background In […]
Vol. 40 No. 9 BLOCKING CONSTITUENTS ON SOCIAL MEDIA WAS A STATE ACTION WHERE PUBLIC OFFICIAL HAD ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO SPEAK ON STATE’S BEHALF AND PURPORTED TO EXERCISE THAT AUTHORITY WHEN POSTING
In Garnier v. O’Connor-Ratcliff,[1] the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a public official’s blocking of individuals on her social media accounts constituted state action under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187 (2024). The Court of Appeals concluded that the official possessed actual […]
Vol. 40 No. 7 NO FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION WHERE WARRANTLESS ENTRY AND SEARCH OF PLAINTIFF’S HOME WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE HOT-PURSUIT EXCEPTION
In Newman v. Underhill,[1] the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the hot-pursuit exception to the warrant requirement applied in affirming summary judgment for deputies where they entered a plaintiff’s home without a warrant while pursuing a fleeing suspect. In reaching its conclusion, the Court held that, as a matter of law, (1) the […]
Vol. 40 No. 8 BECAUSE CALIFORNIA TORT LAW’S “REASONABLE CARE” STANDARD IS BROADER AND DISTINCT FROM THE FEDERAL FOURTH AMENDMENT’S REASONABLENESS STANDARD, NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT JURY’S MIXED VERDICTS – FINDING DEPUTIES DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE BUT WERE NEGLIGENT UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW – WERE RECONCILABLE
In Alves v. Cnty. of Riverside,[1] the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a jury’s mixed verdicts finding deputies did not use excessive force under the Fourth Amendment but were nonetheless negligent under California law were reconcilable on a reasonable theory consistent with the evidence. In reaching its conclusion, the Court explained that California […]
Vol. 40 No. 4 PENAL CODE SECTION 148(A)(1) DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW THEY RESISTED, DELAYED, OR OBSTRUCTED A PEACE OFFICER. IT IS ENOUGH FOR A TRIER OF FACT TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW OR REASONABLY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THE PERSON THEY RESISTED WAS A PEACE OFFICER
In People v. Serna,[1] a California Court of Appeal held that Penal Code section 148(a)(1) does not require that a defendant have actual knowledge they are resisting, delaying, or obstructing a police officer. It is sufficient for trier of fact to find the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the person they resisted […]
Vol. 40 No. 3 FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION WHERE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY ACCESSED CELL PHONE DATA FROM ANOTHER JURISDICTION IN THE ABSENCE OF A WARRANT OR ANY SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
In Olson v. Cnty. of Grant,[1] a case where a law enforcement agency accessed the cell phone contents of a person arrested in another jurisdiction though the accessing agency lacked a warrant, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the agency violated the person’s Fourth Amendment rights. Despite this conclusion, however, the Court affirmed […]
Vol. 40 No. 2 NO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ON EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM WHERE POLICE USED BODYWEIGHT FORCE ON THE BACK OF A PRONE INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS MENTALLY ILL, NOT SUSPECTED OF A CRIME, AND DID NOT PRESENT A RISK TO OFFICERS OR OTHERS
In its July 2024 decision in Scott v. Smith,[1] a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel denied qualified immunity to police officers on an excessive force claim in which an officer temporarily used bodyweight compression on a prone individual’s back and neck. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted the individual was mentally ill, was […]