COURT OF APPEAL RULES THAT LAPD POLICY ON IMPOUNDING VEHICLES IS LEGAL
On December 26, 2014, the California Second District Court of Appeal held, in LAPPL v. City of Los Angeles, et al, that the LAPD “Special Order 7,” regarding when officers could impound vehicles driven by unlicensed drivers, was lawful. Harold Sturgeon, a Los Angeles County taxpayer, and the Los Angeles Police Protective League (League), an association representing sworn peace officers, sought to invalidate the Los Angeles Police Department’s policy regarding impounding vehicles.
Special Order 7 limits an individual officer’s discretion to decide whether a vehicle should be impounded because it sets forth criteria for when a vehicle should be impounded and when the vehicle should be released. In addition to setting forth criteria for impounding vehicles, the special order informed officers which statute to use as authority for the impoundment.
The Superior Court overruled the City’s demurrers challenging, among other things, Sturgeon and the League’s standing and, thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that Special Order 7 was preempted by the Vehicle Code’s general preemption statute and, also, conflicted with section 14602.6 and 14607.6 and, therefore, was void. The court permanently restrained the City and the Los Angeles Police Department from enforcing Special Order 7.
The League then filed an appeal and the Court of Appeal held that, “The special order seeks to implement Vehicle Code sections 14602.6 and 14607.6 and directs officers when to use those sections and other state statutes governing impounds. We conclude that Special Order 7 is within the wide discretion of the police chief, and that neither Sturgeon nor the League has standing to challenge the chief’s implementation of the state statutes. Because they lack standing to pursue this litigation, we reverse the judgment entered in favor of Sturgeon and the League.”
Discussion
“Two statutes governing unlicensed drivers are central to the parties’ arguments in this case. Section 14602.6 allows a peace officer to impound a vehicle when the officer determines that a person was driving the vehicle without ever having been issued a driver’s license. (§ 14602.6, subd. (a)(1) (section 14602.6(a)(1)).) And section 14607.6, subdivision (c)(1) provides: ‘If a driver is unable to produce a valid driver’s license on the demand of a peace officer enforcing the provisions of this code, . . . the vehicle shall be impounded regardless of ownership, unless the peace officer is reasonably able, by other means, to verify that the driver is properly licensed.’”
The Court discusses the taxpayer’s limited right to sue under these circumstances. “Courts have stressed that taxpayer standing should not be conferred when the taxpayer challenges ‘political’ issues or issues involving the exercise of the discretion of either the legislative or executive branches of government.”
“Sturgeon argues that his claim that Special Order 7 is illegal because it is preempted [by state law] ‘takes his claim beyond a question of mere government discretion.’ According to him his ‘illegality’ claim does not implicate any discretionary acts by Defendants-Appellants.” However, the Court of Appeal disagreed.
“As Sturgeon argues, principles governing preemption are well established. ‘Local ordinances and regulations are subordinate to state law. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) Insofar as a local regulation conflicts with state law, it is preempted and invalid. ‘A conflict exists if the local legislation ‘duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.’” (Emphasis in original.) But, states the Court of Appeal, “Special Order 7 implements state law; it does not create a new law.”
The Court notes that, “(t)he order seeks to ensure uniform application of the Vehicle Code among the 10,000 sworn officers in Los Angeles. It accurately reports that several different statutes authorize impounding vehicles. It sets forth criteria for officers to use in selecting which statute to apply. Setting such uniform criteria falls within the broad discretion of the police chief. City officials may set policies that are consistent with state law and constitutional standards.”
The Court also found that the League lacked standing to sue. “For the same reasons explained above with respect to Sturgeon’s arguments, the League’s argument that Special Order 7 conflicts with state law lacks merit. The League additionally argues that section 14602.6 vests discretion solely in the individual officer, and it cannot be limited by the police chief.”
“The statutory language does not support the League’s interpretation that an individual officer rather than the police chief has sole discretion to determine when impounding a vehicle is proper. The statute references the peace officer because the peace officer is the person who interacts with the driver. Neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history support the conclusion that the Legislature intended to remove a police chief’s discretion in implementing statutes regulating the impoundment of vehicles driven by unlicensed drivers.”
HOW THIS AFFECTS YOUR AGENCY
The Court of Appeal held that a police chief retains the authority to establish guidance for his/her officers as to the enforcement of a state law.
“The doctrine of preemption does not apply to the police chief’s implementation of state law because preemption requires the comparison of two separate laws to determine if one duplicates or conflicts with the other” but here, the Court found, “the police chief’s order ‘provid[es] guidance regarding the enforcement’ of the Vehicle Code.” (Emphasis added.) “A chief of police may set policies for the City on police matters. . . . ”
The Court discusses why the Special Order does not conflict with the Vehicle Code, but the primary focus of its decision rests on its conclusion that the parties do not have standing to sue. “Because they lack standing to pursue this litigation, we reverse the judgment entered in favor of Sturgeon and the League.”
Nonetheless, as of now, if a Police Chief or Sheriff were to establish a policy setting forth similar guidelines regarding the impounding of vehicles under Vehicle Code 14602.6 or 14607.6, this decision would be binding on the legality of such a policy. It is also important to note that the Court points out that “Section 14602.6(a)(1) confers a discretionary authority to impound—not mandatory authority,” and that “Officers’ discretionary decisions may be constrained by an authorized policymaker.”
As we consistently note, it is imperative that you seek out and secure advice and guidance from your agency’s legal counsel when applying the law. However, as always, if you wish to discuss this case in greater detail, please feel free to contact me at (714) 446-1400 or via email at mjm@jones-mayer.com.
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