Vol. 39 No. 11 THE PRESENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ONE CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING DOES NOT CATEGORICALLY DEFEAT A FOURTH AMENDMENT MALICIOUS-PROSECUTION CLAIM RELATING TO ANOTHER, BASELESS CHARGE

In Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon,[1] the Supreme Court of the United States vacated a Circuit Court’s holding that a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim may not succeed when a baseless charge brought by a government official is accompanied by a valid charge.  The high court held instead that any valid charges do not insulate the […]

Vol. 39 No. 10 SUPREME COURT REVERSES OREGON HOMELESSNESS CASE, FINDS PUBLIC CAMPING LAWS DO NOT CONSTITUTE “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT” PROHIBITED BY THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

Today in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson,[1] the United States Supreme Court ruled that the City of Grants Pass did not violate the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when enforcing anti-camping ordinances against homeless individuals.  Additionally, the Supreme Court’s ruling overturns Martin v. Boise, a 2018 decision by the Court of Appeals […]

Significant Victory for Cities and Law Enforcement as Supreme Court Reverses Oregon Homelessness Case. Jones Mayer Was Proud to Represent Our Clients in Filing an Amici Brief That Assisted the Court in Making Its Ruling

Today in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the City of Grants Pass did not violate the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when enforcing anti-camping ordinances against homeless individuals. Additionally, the Supreme Court’s ruling overturns Martin v. Boise, a 2018 decision by the Court of Appeals […]

Vol. 39 No. 8 OFFICER’S USE OF PAROLEE’S THUMB TO ACCESS HIS CELLPHONE DID NOT RENDER THE SEARCH UNREASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT NOR VIOLATE HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

In United States v. Payne,[1] the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a parolee’s motion to suppress evidence.  The Court concluded that an officer’s use of a parolee’s fingerprint to unlock the parolee’s phone did not violate his constitutional rights under the circumstances presented and the parole conditions applicable here. Background In […]

Vol. 39 No. 9 DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE IN HIGH CRIME AREA AND SEEMINGLY ODD BEHAVIOR AFTER SPOTTING POLICE DID NOT JUSTIFY REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

In People v. Flores,[1] a defendant initially tried to avoid being seen by police officers, subsequently failed to acknowledge the officers’ approach, and sought to avoid interacting with them.  The Supreme Court of California held that the defendant’s behavior, along with his presence in a high crime area at night, were insufficient to provide reasonable […]

Vol. 39  No. 7 POLICE MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY CONDUCT AN INVENTORY SEARCH OF BELONGINGS WHEN THE PROPERTY IS LAWFULLY RETAINED AND THE SEARCH IS DONE IN COMPLIANCE WITH POLICE REGULATIONS, EVEN AFTER THE INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN RELEASED

In United States v. Sapalasan,1 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress drug evidence found during an officer’s inventory search of an individual’s backpack. The court held that police may constitutionally conduct an inventory search of belongings when the property is lawfully retained and the search is done […]

Vol. 39  No. 6 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SHIELDED OFFICER BECAUSE, EVEN IF HER FIFTH AND SIX SHOTS AT DECEDENT WERE UNREASONABLE, IT WAS NOT AN OBVIOUS SITUATION IN WHICH EVERY REASONABLE OFFICER WOULD HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE LAW FORBADE FIRING ADDITIONAL SHOTS AT ALREADY WOUNDED ARMED DECEDENT AS HE CONTINUED TO TRY TO GET UP

In March 2024, the Ninth Circuit Court in Est. of Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles1 held that although a reasonable jury could have concluded an officer used excessive force, qualified immunity shielded her because no precedent squarely governed the facts presented here. Background In April 2020, Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) Officers Toni McBride […]

Vol. 39 No. 5 A PUBLIC OFFICIAL WHO PREVENTS SOMEONE FROM COMMENTING ON THE OFFICIAL’S SOCIAL-MEDIA PAGE ENGAGES IN STATE ACTION UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983 ONLY IF THE OFFICIAL BOTH POSSESSED ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO SPEAK ON THE STATE’S BEHALF ON A PARTICULAR MATTER, AND PURPORTED TO EXERCISE THAT AUTHORITY WHEN SPEAKING IN THE RELEVANT SOCIAL-MEDIA POSTS

On March 15, 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in a case entitled Lindke v. Freed.1  In this case, the Court established a new standard to assess whether a social media account managed by a local, state, or federal government official subjects that public official to a potential First Amendment violation under […]

Lindke v. Freed and O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier SCOTUS Clarifies Standard for Plaintiffs to Sue Public Officials for Social Media Restraint

On March 15, 2024, the United States Supreme Court, in Lindke v. Freed1 and O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier2 established a new standard to assess whether a social medial account run by local, state, or federal government officials subjects that public official to a potential First Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The decisions clarify when […]