Vol. 40 No. 4 PENAL CODE SECTION 148(A)(1) DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW THEY RESISTED, DELAYED, OR OBSTRUCTED A PEACE OFFICER. IT IS ENOUGH FOR A TRIER OF FACT TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW OR REASONABLY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THE PERSON THEY RESISTED WAS A PEACE OFFICER
Vol. 39 No. 15 NINTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS IN PART AND REVERSES IN PART DISTRICT COURT ORDERS PRELIMINARY ENJOINING THE IMPLEMENTATION OR ENFORCEMENT OF SEVERAL PROVISIONS OF CALIFORNIA LAW THAT PROHIBITS PERSONS WITH CONCEALED-CARRY PERMITS FROM CARRYING FIREARMS ONTO VARIOUS TYPES OF PROPERTY
Vol. 39 No. 6 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SHIELDED OFFICER BECAUSE, EVEN IF HER FIFTH AND SIX SHOTS AT DECEDENT WERE UNREASONABLE, IT WAS NOT AN OBVIOUS SITUATION IN WHICH EVERY REASONABLE OFFICER WOULD HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE LAW FORBADE FIRING ADDITIONAL SHOTS AT ALREADY WOUNDED ARMED DECEDENT AS HE CONTINUED TO TRY TO GET UP
Vol. 39 No. 5 A PUBLIC OFFICIAL WHO PREVENTS SOMEONE FROM COMMENTING ON THE OFFICIAL’S SOCIAL-MEDIA PAGE ENGAGES IN STATE ACTION UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983 ONLY IF THE OFFICIAL BOTH POSSESSED ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO SPEAK ON THE STATE’S BEHALF ON A PARTICULAR MATTER, AND PURPORTED TO EXERCISE THAT AUTHORITY WHEN SPEAKING IN THE RELEVANT SOCIAL-MEDIA POSTS